This article seeks to test whether African investment treaties present a specific approach -i.e. distinct from the North-American and Western Hemisphere -to fair and equitable treatment (FET) and (full) protection and security (FPS). The first main argument is that the concepts of FET and FPS are not substantially impacted by the mere fact of being included in investment agreements to which African States are party. The second main argument is that the understanding, interpretation and definitions of these concepts within Africa is not fundamentally different than in other regions. Thirdly, notwithstanding the similarity in the wording of these standards of treatment in African investment treaties, there may still be room for taking into account the specific circumstances of the States in which the investment is made, including the level of development of the host State.
Introduction
Fair and equitable treatment (FET) without doubt is the most invoked standard in investment treaty arbitration. Its importance, as a standard of investment protection, can therefore not be underestimated. While the (full) protection and security (FPS) standard is less invoked in isolation of FET, it has in the past played an important role in relation to investments affected by armed conflict,1 including conflicts in Africa. 2 There is a notable and rather neat distinction between the formulation of FET and FPS in both North-American investment treaties and 'Western Hemisphere' bilateral investment treaties (BITs) which are used in European States. The latter tend to include FET as a stand-alone standard of treatment, while North-American investment treaties, as exemplified inter alia in the North-American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)3 and the US Model BIT 2012,4 tend to equate FET with the customary norm on the international minimum standard of treatment which includes providing (full) protection and security. In addition to North-American investment treaties and 'Western Hemisphere'-BITs, The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) considered in a 2005 study, that a third approach is found in South-South BITs which however differs only limitedly from the preceding two models. This article seeks to test that finding and its relevance today, by investigating whether African investment agreements present a specific approach that is distinct from the North-American and Western Hemisphere. It will test this hypothesis in relation to the FET and FPS standards of treatment.
The main argument of this article is that the concepts of FET and FPS are not substantially impacted by the mere fact of being included in investment agreements between African and third States. The main reason for this, as I will explain, is that African States usually make no use of their own model BIT and thus, when negotiating and signing BITs with third States, use is made of the model BITs of the European or North-American partner States.
FET and FPS are included in the IMS.6 Others have contended on the contrary that all three standards of treatment are independent treaty standards.7 I do not intend to settle these controversies here.
FPS and FET (and IMS) are generally referred to as non-contingent, absolute or objective standards of treatment as opposed to contingent, relative or subjective standards, such as national treatment or most favoured nation (MFN) treatment.8 The latter category of standards of treatment impose on the host State the obligation to act in a certain way by reference to how other investors or investments are treated, e.g. national investors or investments in case of national treatment, or investors or investments from third States in case of MFN treatment. The objective of such standards is that States may not discriminate between investors and investments; whether or not the State has exercised due diligence in this respect is irrelevant. Objective standards, such as FET and FPS, on the other hand require from the State to act in a certain 'objective' way, as required under international law (either custom or treaty law) irrespective of how other investors or investments are treated. There is in other words no comparison with the treatment of other investors or investments. This is precisely why, as I will explain in the last Section, FET and FPS allow for the taking into account of the specific circumstances of the host State.
The FET standard is a flexible and rather vague concept. However, it is generally accepted that the legitimate expectations of the foreign investor form a key element of FET,9 as are obligations of due process, transparency, freedom from coercion and harassment, stability, predictability and a general duty of due diligence.10 FET requires at least treatment in accordance with the IMS as understood in general international law.11 6 See specific substantive content, such as the prohibition of a denial of justice or non-discrimination.18 Provisions granting protection and security to investments and investors vary in nature. Some treaties refer to 'full protection and security' , while others provide for 'protection and security' or 'constant protection and security ' .19 As explained in regard to FET, it is not the purpose here to engage in a discussion of these variances. Thus, the standard will be referred to here as FPS despite the existing different wordings. Indeed, the current conception of the FPS standard of treatment -however phrased -comprises the obligation for States to provide physical or police protection to foreign investments and investors from harm caused by the State itself or by third parties which includes the obligations to prevent, punish and apprehend, as well as to possess and make available a functioning administrative and legal system to that effect.20 Some tribunals moreover have argued that the differences in wording do not make a substantive difference.21 Also, the use of 'protection' rather than 'protection and security' does not change the level of police protection a host State is required to provide.22 Besides the requirement of providing physical protection and security, certain tribunals have, in particular when the word 'full' precedes 'protection and security' , extended the application of the standard to which is required by that standard, and do not create additional substantive rights. The obligation in paragraph 1 to provide: (a) "fair and equitable treatment" includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world. investment treaties, namely the one that can be found in South-South BITs, which are close to the European approach.31 According to UNCTAD, SouthSouth BITs, which includes intra-African BITs, would essentially differ from the preceding two models, in that they 'put more emphasis on exceptions (e.g. for balance-of-payments or prudential measures) and the so-called forkin-the-road clause.'32 These distinctive features are alien to the standards of treatment under consideration here, and as the following overview will show, the concepts of FET and FPS are in general not substantially impacted by the mere fact of being included in intra-African BITs, nor in BITs concluded between African States and third States. Here again little difference can be found in the FET and FPS provisions, which is not only linked, again, to the fact that African States usually make no use of their own model BIT, but also to the fact that African States have generally followed the European approach to investment treaties and have therefore taken over the main provisions of these treaties.58 Based on this BIT practice, the understanding, interpretation and definitions of FET and FPS within Africa seem consequently not to be fundamentally different than in other regions. Regional African Investment Agreements and the SADC Model BIT Contrary to the majority of the intra-African BITs, some regional African investment agreements do indicate an Africa-specific understanding of FET and FPS. However, not all African regional free trade agreements contain substantive investment protection provisions. The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community (EAC) from 1999 for instance contains commitments by which States parties agreed to adopt measures to achieve the free movement of persons and services, but does not contain substantive investment protection provisions. In those regional agreements, which include an FET or FPS provision, such as the COMESA Agreement59 or the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment,60 these FET and FPS clauses do not indicate any specific deviance from the general formulations one finds in other investment agreements.
Africa-Specific Formulations of FET and FPS
However, over the past years, certain African investment agreements show specific features in relation to FET and FPS, which may be seen as heralds of a possible specific African conception of these standards. The most important example here is the Investment Agreement for the COMESA61 Common Investment Area,62 which however has not entered into force. This treaty, first of all, has no FPS clause. Secondly, the agreement has a very specific FET clause, phrased as follows: to have such a provision in an investment agreement, and to that effect, it does indicate a special approach to the FET and FPS standard.
The SADC Model BIT66 also provides for a specific approach, not only on BITs in general, but more specifically on FET and FPS provisions. However, this model has not yet been used in practice. The SADC Model BIT takes again a rather strict approach to FET, and contains two options. The first one links FET to the customary IMS -in line with the US and Canadian practice -but contains in its second paragraph a definition of that customary IMS which incorporates almost verbatim the Neer formulation of that standard:67 the propriety of governmental acts should be put to the test of international standards, and (second) that the treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency, should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to willful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency. Whether the insufficiency proceeds from deficient execution of an intelligent law or from the fact that the laws of the country do not empower the authorities to measure up to international standards is immaterial. In relation to the second option, the Commentary to the SADC Model BIT states that this 'is an alternative formulation that would be a new approach to addressing key issues in a more restricted and careful manner than the FET text.'70 It is explicitly formatted as a reaction to the broad interpretations of is the least likely to lead to mischief through expansive interpretations by arbitrators. '71 As far as FPS is concerned, the SADC Model BIT is interesting since it couples FPS with the national treatment and MFN treatment standards. Article 9 provides that 9.1. A State Party shall accord Investments of Investors of the other State Party protection and security no less favourable than that which it accords to investments of its own investors or to investments of investors of any third State. 9.2. Investors of one State Party whose Investments in the territory of the other State Party suffer losses as a result of a breach of paragraph 9.1, in particular owing to war or other armed conflict, revolution, revolt, insurrection or riot in the territory of the Host State shall be accorded by the Host State treatment, as regards restitution, indemnification, compensation or other settlement, no less favourable than that which the Host State accords to investors of any third State.
As the Commentary also indicates, this approach is not extraordinary, and one finds such formulations of FPS in many other investment agreements,72 also in relation to the FET standard.73 In essence, despite being promoted as a stand-alone clause,74 the protection and security clause does not seem to add anything substantial to an FPS clause limited to physical protection. An MFN clause generally is missing in the SADC Model BIT, based on the consideration that 'these should be bilateral treaties and that, as such, they should not establish unintended multilateralization through the MFN provision. More recently, SADC Member States have adopted certain important changes to the SADC Finance and Investment Protocol76, and notably to its Annex 1 which contains the investment protection standards. The changes as such have not (yet) been made public.77 The main change relevant for this article relates to Article 6.1 of Annex 1, which granted investors fair and equitable treatment. The FET standard has been removed and apparently replaced by a clause providing instead for national treatment.78 National treatment moreover is subjected to preferential treatment for local investors in case of domestic legislation adopted to further 'national development objectives' .79 The amended protocol has not yet been ratified, but the changes brought to the text may be seen, as is the case with the SADC Model BIT discussed above, as heralding a new direction for African -or more broadly for (developing) countries which are dissatisfied with the current investment protection standards -approaches to investment protection.
2.2
Africa the legal and administrative framework of the host State, and the generalcircular -expectation of a fair and equitable conduct by the host State. 83 As was shown in the previous Section, Article 14 (3) of the COMESA Investment Agreement contains a provision to the effect that FET is made dependent on the level of development of the host State. Besides the inclusion in a treaty of such a provision, one may validly argue that the legitimate expectations of foreign investors differ according to whether the investment is made in a developed or in a developing State, and that as a consequence the application of the FET standard, at least as far as the expectations of investors are concerned, is necessarily linked to the specific level of development of the host State. This is of course not limited to African States.
First, FET must be appreciated in concreto taking into account the specific circumstances of each case, both from a factual and from a contextual perspective.84 As one author puts it, 'the subjective element is the flesh that covers the carcass of the standard, giving it life. It is only when the FET standard is applied to a specific case that it becomes alive.'85 Application of the FET standard should thus not only depend on the specific facts of the case, but more importantly on the circumstances and the context in which the investment was made. The latter assessment criterion includes the political and economic situation of the host State. Although this will be more visible in relation to the FPS standard because of the application of the due diligence standard, as I will explain in the next Section, there is no reason to exclude the influence of the level of development of the host State in relation to the FET standard. In this context, I should also point out that investors should act with due diligence in making the investment.86 The idea is a corollary to the mentioned principle that the legitimate expectations of foreign investors differ according to whether the investment is made in a developed or a developing State.
Case law in this respect however is limited. The Tribunal in Parkerings, for instance, noted that the foreign investor has a right to a certain stability and predictability of the legal environment of the investment. The investor will have a right of protection of its legitimate expectations provided it exercised due diligence and that its legitimate expectations were reasonable in light of the circumstances. Consequently, an investor must anticipate that the circumstances could change, and thus structure its investment in order to adapt it to the potential changes of legal environment.87
In the same vein, the Tribunal in Biwater Gauff explained Protection of legitimate expectations: the purpose of the fair and equitable treatment standard is to provide to international investments treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to make the investment, as long as these expectations are reasonable and legitimate and have been relied upon by the investor to make the investment.88
The Tribunal in Eudoro Armando Olguín v Republic of Paraguay explained in relation to claims for violation of the FET standard and an expropriation claim that This Tribunal does not accept Mr. Olguín's contention that he was induced to make his investment by the bulletins issued by the Central Bank of Paraguay. To the contrary, the Tribunal feels that prudence would have prompted a foreigner arriving in a country that had suffered severe economic problems to be much more conservative in his investments.89
3.2
FPS and the Due Diligence Requirement Due diligence is present in a variety of aspects of the protection of foreign investors in international investment law. In the current conception of the FPS standard, the host state is in breach of its international obligation to guarantee FPS, if it fails to exercise due diligence in taking all necessary measures in order to provide physical and security protection to the foreign investor from Article II (2) (a) of the Treaty provides that '[i]nvestment … shall enjoy full protection and security' . There is no further definition of this obligation in the Treaty. The Arbitral Tribunal is of the opinion that the Treaty obliges the Parties to exercise such due diligence in the protection of foreign investment as reasonable under the circumstances. However, the Treaty does not oblige the Parties to protect foreign investment against any possible loss of value caused by persons whose acts could not be attributed to the State. Such protection would indeed amount to strict liability, which can not be imposed to a State absent any specific provision in the Treaty.91
The host State thus holds no strict liability for such harm.92 A host State should thus take all measures that it could reasonably be expected to take in order to prevent the occurrence of damages to the foreign investor and its investment. 93 The same principles apply to host State's obligations in case of armed conflict, civil strife, revolution or natural disasters.94 A host State should then use 'the police and military forces to protect the interests of the alien to the extent feasible and practicable under the circumstances, both before the event and while it unfolds. '95 Certain authors have argued that international law adheres, generally, to the diligens paterfamilias standard. 96 In his 1955 Hague Academy Lecture, Freeman noted that the standard of due diligence requires 'nothing more nor less than the reasonable measures of prevention which a well-administered government could be expected to exercise under similar circumstances.'97 This is an 'objective' assessment criterion.
The objective standard has however been rejected by several scholars and arbitrators, which have instead relied on the 'subjective due diligence standard' , taking into consideration the means that are at the disposal of the host State, as well as the specific circumstances present in the host State.98 In assessing the due diligence standard, Brownlie supports the application of the diligentia quam in suis standard, rather than the diligens pater familias standard,99 arguing that the applicable standard is the standard ordinarily observed by the particular State in its own affairs, which means that variations in the wealth between States can be taken into account.100 This is in line with the application of the principle of other fields of international law, such as international environmental law. The International Law Commission (ILC), in its Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, for instance, consider that the 'economic level of States is one of the factors to be taken into account in determining whether a State has complied with its obligation of due diligence' , in relation to States' obligation of prevention, noting at the same time that 'a State's economic level cannot be used to dispense the State from its obligation. '101 Also, more recent cases suggest that the applicable standard is a subjective due diligence standard. In Lauder v Czech Republic, the Tribunal considered that the FPS obligation 'obliges the Parties to exercise such due diligence in the protection of foreign investment as reasonable under the circumstances.'102 In CME v Czech Republic, the Tribunal also explained that 'a government is only obliged to provide protection which is reasonable in the circumstances. ' 103 Sole arbitrator Jan Paulsson in Pantechniki v Albania also unambiguously adopted the subjective assessment method, distinguishing 'physical protection and security' from 'denial of justice' , the latter not requiring to take into account the resources of the State, but the former allowing to take account of the resources of the State: A failure of protection and security is to the contrary likely to arise in an unpredictable instance of civic disorder which could have been readily controlled by a powerful state but which overwhelms the limited capacities of one which is poor and fragile. There is no issue of incentives or disincentives with regard to unforeseen breakdowns of public order; it seems difficult to maintain that a government incurs international responsibility for failure to plan for unprecedented trouble of unprecedented magnitude in unprecedented places. The case for an element of proportionality in applying the international standard is stronger than with respect to claims of denial of justice.104
Conclusion
FET and FPS constitute, from a substantive perspective, important protection standards in investment agreements, both generally and specifically in Africa investment relations.
In addition to North-American investment treaties and 'Western Hemisphere'-BITs which are used by European States, UNCTAD considers a third approach found in South-South BITs, which however differs from the preceding two models in other aspects than the standards under consideration here. Based on these starting points, this article's main attempt has been to investigate whether African investment agreements present a specific approach to FET and FPS in international investment agreements.
This article has argued that treaty practice, between African States and third States as well as between African States, shows no different conception of FET or FPS, in the sense that a specific African model would exist. It has, on the contrary been shown that in BITs between African and third States, the used FPS and FET clauses depend very much on the contracting third State, and in relation to intra-African BITs that they reflect the FET and FPS clauses usually found in European BITs.
The main explanations for the absence of a specific formulation of FET and FPS in African investment treaties are first, the absence, of a specific understanding of FET and FPS in the investment policies of African States, and secondly, the absence of African States' model BITs which are used for negotiations. Besides the mentioned exceptions in the recent COMESA Investmentwhich has not entered into force-and the SADC Model BIT -which has not
